In the course of writing my book on British banking stability, I've been thinking a lot about financial repression. Financial repression is where governments repress the financial system in order to generate low nominal rates and negative real rates of interest. After World War II, most combatants had really high levels of debt. Consequently, governments used financial repression to reduce their debt servicing costs as well as the real value of their debt. After the 2007-8 financial crisis, many economies have very high levels of government debt. How can they reduce the real value of this debt and keep their debt-servicing costs low? The answer is financial repression - low nominal rates, negative real rates, and a small dose of inflation. You can read more about financial repression here and here.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak and Todd Mitton have written a paper on whether firms connected to Timothy Geithner benefited from these connections. They do so by looking at how stocks of these firms reacted to the announcement that he was a nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008. They find that there were large abnormal returns for connected firms. Below is the paper's abstract and the full paper is available here . The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected firms may reflect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small ne...