Does having a hedge fund as a substantial shareholder improve corporate governance? Unlike other institutional investors, hedge funds are not afraid to (a) take large stakes in companies and (b) be activist in their ownership i.e., they attempt to exert influence on CEOs. A recent court case brought against Apple by one of its shareholders, Greenlight Capital, a hedge fund run by David Einhorn, nicely illustrates the way in which hedge funds try to influence companies in which they have stakes. Greenlight Capital is trying to get Apple to return some of its $137 billion cash pile (two-thirds of its balance sheet) to shareholders. Apple has been hoarding cash since 1995 and in 2012 paid its first dividend in 17 years. Apple has by far the largest cash pile of any corporation in the world - click here.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak and Todd Mitton have written a paper on whether firms connected to Timothy Geithner benefited from these connections. They do so by looking at how stocks of these firms reacted to the announcement that he was a nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008. They find that there were large abnormal returns for connected firms. Below is the paper's abstract and the full paper is available here . The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected firms may reflect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small ne...