I've recently finished reading Fragile by Design by Charles Calomiris and Stephen Haber . The basic premise of their book is that politics shapes banking systems and that banking systems become fragile because of politics. Using the political and banking histories of the UK, US, Canada, Mexico and Brazil, they argue that the well-being of banking systems depends upon the ability of political institutions to limit and balance the interests of coalitions groups whose bargaining power determines the shape and structure of the banking system. Calomiris and Haber argue that there is a 'Game of Bank Bargains', where the structure etc. of a banking system is a result of a bargaining game between politicians, taxpayers, depositors, businesses, bankers, bank shareholders, and debtors. This is a must-read book. Although I largely agree with their basic premise, I see things slightly differently. In my new book Banking in Crisis , I too argue that the fragility or otherwise of...