Questions about ownership and control occupy a lot of my cognitive energy. They are also important questions within finance, law, management, and economics. Is separating ownership and control a good idea? Most of modern finance is premised on the idea that it is a bad idea and that the resultant agency problem needs addressed using all sorts of incentives. However, Colin Mayer in Firm Commitment suggests that separating ownership from control may have been a helpful innovation in the evolution of the corporation in that third parties are more likely to enter commitments and contracts with firms which don't have a dominant owner. Along with two co-authors I argue in this article that the ability to separate ownership from control is one of the rationales for the corporation.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak and Todd Mitton have written a paper on whether firms connected to Timothy Geithner benefited from these connections. They do so by looking at how stocks of these firms reacted to the announcement that he was a nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008. They find that there were large abnormal returns for connected firms. Below is the paper's abstract and the full paper is available here . The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected firms may reflect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small ne...