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Anniversary of Banking in Crisis

This very day last year, my book Banking in Crisis was published by Cambridge University Press. Since its publication, I have given talks about it at the Bank of England, Schroders, the Library of Mistakes in Edinburgh, University College Dublin, and Lund University. I also enjoyed launching the book back in September at Queen's Management School.

It was great seeing my book go into the top 10,000 books in Amazon and I enjoyed getting my first royalty cheque - nowhere near a 'living wage' could be obtained from authoring academic books in case you are wondering! The year ahead will bring academic reviews in scholarly journals - I'm interested to see what my academic peers will have to say about my book. It has already been reviewed favourably on a few book websites (Goodreads and the Page 99 test).

Unfortunately, the aftermath of the 2008 crisis is still with us - witness Greece, near-zero interest rates, QE, low economic growth etc.. Unstable banking has a huge economic cost. Because of this, we need to make sure that banks don't bring down the economy again. How can this be achieved? At the minute, we have financial repression of banks, but as this eases off over the next decade, what will stop bankers taking excessive risk? The lesson of UK banking history is that stable banking can only exist when bankers have 'skin in the game'.





  

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