Can the lessons of the past help us to prevent another banking
collapse in the future? This is the first book to tell the story of the rise
and fall of British banking stability in the past two centuries, and it sheds
new light on why banking systems crash and the factors underpinning banking
stability. John Turner shows that there were only two major banking crises in
Britain during this time: the crisis of 1825ā6 and the Great Crash of
2007ā8. Although there were episodic bouts of instability in the interim, the
banking system was crisis-free. Why was the British banking system stable for
such a long time and why did the British banking system implode in 2008? In
answering these questions, the book explores the long-run evolution of bank
regulation, the role of the Bank of England, bank rescues and the need to hold
shareholders to account.
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak and Todd Mitton have written a paper on whether firms connected to Timothy Geithner benefited from these connections. They do so by looking at how stocks of these firms reacted to the announcement that he was a nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008. They find that there were large abnormal returns for connected firms. Below is the paper's abstract and the full paper is available here . The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected firms may reflect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small ne...